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Despite recent reforms, world agricultural markets remain highly distorted by 
government policies. Traditional indicators of those price distortions such as producer and 
consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) can be poor guides to the policies’ economic 
effects. Recent theoretical literature provides scalar index numbers of trade- and welfare-
reducing effects of price and trade policies which this paper builds on to develop more-
satisfactory indexes that can be generated using no more than the data used to generate PSEs and 
CSEs. We then exploit a new Agricultural Distortion database to provide time series estimates of 
index numbers for 75 developing and high-income countries over the past half century.  
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 Global Distortions to Agricultural Markets:  




Despite reforms over the past quarter-century, world agricultural markets remain highly 
distorted, and international trade in farm products has grown much slower than trade in non-farm 
goods.
1 Traditional indicators such as the nominal rate of tariff protection from import 
competition understate the degree of distortion if there are other border taxes or subsidies or 
quantitative restrictions, and even more so if there are also domestic producer or consumer taxes 
or subsidies on farm products. The OECD’s producer and consumer support estimates (PSEs and 
CSEs) based on domestic to border price comparisons for high-income countries, and the World 
Bank’s new comparable estimates of nominal rates of assistance and consumer tax equivalents 
(NRAs and CTEs) for both high-income and developing countries, provide better indicators 
(OECD 2008; Anderson 2009).
2 Those estimates can be used in national and global computable 
                                                 
1 Based on a sample of 75 countries comprising more than 90 percent of global agriculture and 95 percent of the 
world’s economy, Anderson (2009) estimates that the share of global production of agricultural goods that is 
exported has increased from 11 percent in the 1960s and 1970s to just 16 percent in 1990-2004, a far smaller 
increase than for non-farm goods during that period of rapid globalization. When intra-EU trade is excluded, 
agriculture’s share of global production exported was just 8 percent in 2004, compared with 31 percent for other 
primary products and 25 percent for all other goods, according to the GTAP Version 7 database (www.gtap.org). 
2 The main difference between the PSE/CSE and NRA/CTE concepts is that the former are expressed as a 
percentage of the distorted price whereas the latter are a percentage of the undistorted price (and the CSE has the 
opposite sign to the CTE). The NRA and CTE values are identical if the only government interventions are at a 
country’s border (such as a tariff on imports). In the case of agriculture, however, typically there are some domestic 
production or consumption taxes or subsidies also in place, so the NRA often differs from the CTE. 2 
 
general equilibrium models to provide an indication of the true trade and welfare effects of such 
distortionary policies. However, such models typically are calibrated only for a recent (or not-so-
recent) year, and so are incapable of providing estimates of trends over time; and they are not yet 
available for many smaller and poorer economies.  
There is thus a need for better indicators over time of the trade- and welfare-reducing 
effects of price-distorting policies than the existing weighted average NRA/CTE (or PSE/CSE) 
estimates for the farm sector of a country. The key reason is that the process of generating those 
weighted averages can hide the fact that distortions vary across industries within the sector. This 
is especially problematic in cases where some industry NRAs are negative, as when trade taxes 
apply also to exports or when dual exchange rates operate. In those cases the sectoral mean NRA 
may be close to zero even though the trade- and welfare-reducing effects of the sector’s 
interventions could be substantial. Further, the sectoral mean NRA may be the same in two 
countries and yet, if the variance of the NRA across industries within that sector is greater in one 
country, so too will be the welfare cost of its policies for that sector. 
Recent theoretical literature provides partial equilibrium indicators of the trade- and 
welfare-reducing effects of import policies that belong to a family of indexes under the catch-all 
name of trade restrictiveness indexes. The purpose of this paper is to draw on that literature in 
order to develop indexes to capture national, regional and global distortions to sectoral incentives 
that are based directly on national estimates of individual product NRAs and CTEs. We then 
exploit the Agricultural Distortion database recently compiled by the World Bank to generate a 
time series of estimates of consistent indexes for the agricultural sector for both developing and 
high-income countries over the past half century. The World Bank global panel dataset contains 
comparable estimates of annual NRAs and CTEs for a wide range of agricultural products 3 
 
(covering around 70 percent of national agricultural production) for around 75 countries that 
together account for all but one-tenth of the world’s population, GDP and agricultural output 
(Anderson and Valenzuela 2008). Applying our indexes to these new data takes us much closer 
to understanding the true trade and welfare effects of farm policies without needing a detailed 
economy wide model.  
These better approximations of the trade and welfare effects of sectoral policies are 
generated with simplifying assumptions about price elasticities that mean we need no more than 
the same price and quantity data compiled to generate traditional indicators of price distortions 
such as the NRA and CTE. By assuming domestic price elasticities of supply are equal across 
commodities within a country, and likewise for elasticities of demand, the formula simplifies to a 
share-weighted function with shares of production and consumption as weights. This is the main 
contribution of this paper: to demonstrate how better indicators of sectoral policy distortions can 
be generated by policy analysts using a simple, elegant and theoretically meaningful 
methodology and no more data than simpler widely-used indicators. Our aim with these new 
measures is not to produce a substitute for detailed results from economy wide or sectoral 
models, but rather to provide better stand-alone indicators of the trade- and welfare-distorting 
effects of policies than are currently being generated with price and quantity data. Since these 
new indicators avoid having to select a pair of price elasticity estimates for each product of each 
country, they could be attractive and politically uncontroversial supplements to the current policy 
monitoring indicators generated by multilateral institutions such as the OECD and WTO. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. After a brief literature review the 
following section presents the theory for estimating trade- and welfare-reduction indexes in the 
import-competing sub-sector. This is then extended to cover the exportables sub-sector. The 4 
 
World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions database is then discussed, followed by presentations of 
the trade- and welfare-reduction indexes for all 75 countries studied in the Agricultural 
Distortions project and for key geographic regions and the world as a whole. We also decompose 
the contributions of individual countries and commodities to the global welfare reduction index. 
Some concluding observations including caveats and directions for further research complete the 
paper. 
 
The recent literature 
 
There is a growing theoretical literature that identifies ways to measure the trade- and welfare-
reducing effects of international trade policy in scalar index numbers. This literature serves a key 
purpose: it overcomes aggregation problems (across different intervention measures and across 
industries) by using a theoretically sound aggregation procedure to answer precise questions 
regarding the trade or welfare reductions imposed by each country’s trade policies. The literature 
has developed considerably over the past two decades, particularly with the theoretical advances 
by Anderson and Neary (summarized in and extended beyond their 2005 book) and the partial 
equilibrium simplifications by Feenstra (1995).  
Notwithstanding these advances, few consistently estimated indexes have yet been 
estimated across time, and even fewer across countries. A prominent exception is the work of 
Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2008, 2009) who, following the approach of Feenstra, estimate a 
series for developing and developed countries. However, those authors provide estimates only 5 
 
for a snapshot in time (the mid-2000s) and based only on import barriers.
3 Most other studies 
have been country specific, such as an application to Mexican agriculture in the late 1980s 
(Anderson, Bannister and Neary 1995). 
The indicators we estimate are well grounded in the theory of trade restrictiveness 
indexes first developed by Anderson and Neary (2005). Specifically, we define two indexes, and 
coin terms for them that are precise descriptors. The names we provide are a trade reduction 
index (TRI) and a welfare reduction index (WRI).
4 The TRI and WRI are computed from sub-
indexes of the production and consumption sides of the market, which are derived from NRA 
and CTE estimates, respectively, across product groups. NRAs to producers and CTEs to 
consumers are required whenever there are domestic subsidies or taxes on production or 
consumption in addition to border measures – as so often is the case for foods and other farm 
products. Thus the indexes we estimate capture the aggregate trade- and welfare-reducing effects 
of all policies directly affecting consumer and producer prices of farm products from all sectoral 
price-distorting policy measures in place.
5  
                                                 
3 Those estimates, which rely mostly on reported tariff rates but include also estimated tariff equivalents of some 
non-tariff import measures, have been reported in the World Bank’s Global Monitoring Report (e.g., World Bank 
2008, pp. 121-23). The present estimates, by contrast, rely on domestic to border price comparisons for each product 
and so directly capture the effects of all border measures as well as domestic behind-the-border price subsidies or 
taxes. 
4 Our labels compare with those in the Anderson and Neary (2005) work as follows. Our WRI measure is the 
Anderson and Neary trade restrictiveness index , and our TRI measure is their mercantilist trade restrictiveness 
index, with an extension to allow for differences between  the NRA and the CTE rates for each good. .   
5 It should be kept in mind that these are partial equilibrium measures: relations of substitutability and 
complementarity between pairs of goods are all set to zero, and the indirect effects of policy measures applying to 
non-agricultural sectors are ignored. Also, we assume there are no externalities or market failures, hence no 6 
 
 
Defining the welfare and trade reduction indexes  
 
The initial theoretical work by Anderson and Neary, leading to their 2005 book, sought to 
derive a general equilibrium measure of the welfare-reducing effects of trade restrictions in a 
country’s import-competing sector. They call this the Trade Restrictiveness Index. The work is 
important in that it solved the problem of how to aggregate assistance across commodities in a 
theoretically meaningful way. They do so for a small, open economy in which imports are 
restricted by tariffs and non-tariff measures (NTMs). They then provide variants of the Trade 
Restrictiveness Index, including one based not on a welfare criterion but instead on an import 
volume criterion, which they call the Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness Index.  
We develop versions of each of those two indexes for situations where, in addition to 
import measures, there may be also export measures and/or direct domestic producer and 
consumer price distortions resulting from behind-the-border measures.
6  While these versions 
are less general than the Anderson and Neary indexes, in that they are partial rather than 
general equilibrium measures, they have the important advantage (particularly for agriculture) 
of being more comprehensive in terms of policy instrument coverage. Here they are developed 
first for agriculture’s import-competing sub-sector and then for its exporting sub-sector. 
 
                                                                                                                                                               
divergences between private and social marginal costs and benefits, including from such things as underinvestment 
in public goods. 
6 Anderson and Neary (2005, Ch. 12) deal with the theory of domestic distortions in a general equilibrium model, 
but not in the simplifying partial equilibrium format used here. 7 
 
The import-competing sub-sector 
 
We take a particular country and assume it has a small open economy in which all markets are 
competitive. However, the market for an import good may be distorted by a tariff and/or other 
non-tariff border measures and/or behind-the-border measures such as domestic subsidies and 
price controls. An example is depicted in Figure 1.   
  We first measure the effect of a country’s distortions on its import volume, the TRI. 
This is defined as the uniform tariff rate which, if applied to all goods in the place of all actual 
border and behind-the-border price distortions, would result in the same reduction in the 
volume of imports (summed across products by valuing them at the undistorted border price) 
as the actual distortions.     
  Consider the market for one good, good i, which is distorted by a combination of 
measures that distort its consumer and producer prices. For the producers of the good, the 
distorted domestic producer price, 
P
i p , is related to the border price, pi
*, by the relation, 
P
i p  = 
pi
*(1 + si ) where si is the rate of distortion of the producer price in proportional terms. For the 
consumers of the good, the distorted domestic consumer price,  , is related to the border 
price by the relation,    = pi
*(1 + ri ) where ri is the rate of distortion of the consumer price in 
proportional terms. In general, ri ≠ si . Using these relations, the change in the value of imports 
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7 If the demand and supply curves happened to be linear, this would be the sum of the areas of the two shaded 
rectangles in Figure 1. 8 
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where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied,  i x and  i y , are functions just of their own 
domestic price:  and  . (The neglect of cross-price effects, among other 
things, is what makes the analysis partial equilibrium.)  
(
C






ii i yy p =
  Strictly speaking, this result holds only for small distortions. In reality rates of distortion 
may not be small. If, however, the demand and supply functions are linear over the relevant 
price range, the effect on imports is given by equation (1) with constant slopes of the demand 
and supply curves in Figure 1 (  and  , respectively). If the functions are not 
linear, this expression provides an approximation to the loss.   
C
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 With  n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate 
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Solving for T, we get 
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R  and  are indices of average consumer and producer price distortions. They are arithmetic 
means. In the empirical section below, these are based respectively on Consumer Tax 
Equivalents (CTEs) and Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) of various farm products.  
S
Evidently, the uniform tariff T can be written as a weighted average of the level of 
distortions of consumer and producer prices. An important advantage of using this 
decomposition of the index into producer and consumer effects is that it treats correctly the 
effects of NTMs and domestic distortions that affect the two sides of the market differently.   
In equation 3c (equation 3b), the weights for each commodity are proportional to the 
marginal response of domestic production (consumption) to changes in international free-trade 
prices. These weights can be written as, among other things, functions of the domestic price 
elasticities (at the protected trade situation) of supply and demand (  and  , respectively): i σ i ρ
8  







i i i i i i i x p x p u ) ( / ) (
* * ρ ρ ∑ =
n
i
i i i i i i i y p y p v ) ( / ) (
* * σ σ
From a practical viewpoint, the next two steps are key to the contribution of this paper. In 
the first step, if one is willing to assume domestic price elasticities of supply (demand) are equal 
across commodities — as is implicitly done when calculating the weighted average NRA (CTE) 
across industries within a sector or sub-sector — then the elasticities in the numerator and 
denominator of equation 4 cancel. This powerful simplifying assumption allows us (in the 
empirical section below) to find R (S) simply by aggregating the change in consumer (producer) 
prices across commodities and using as weights the sectoral share of each commodity’s domestic 
value of consumption (production) at undistorted prices. That is, with this elasticity assumption, 
                                                 
8 These expressions can also be written as functions of, among other things, the domestic price elasticities at the free 
trade points. 10 
 
R and S are attainable with the same information as used to estimate the CTE and NRA – but 
they provide a better indication of the trade-distorting effect of those producer or consumer price 
measures.  
The second step involves the weights a and b (equation 3d), which are required in 
addition to R and S for estimating T in equation 3a. The weight a (b) is proportional to the ratio 
of the marginal response of domestic demand (supply) to a price change relative to the marginal 
response of imports to a price change. If we assume the marginal responses of supply and 
demand to a price change are the same in aggregate for this country, then a=b=0.5.
9 
  With this additional elasticity assumption about the sector’s aggregate supply and 
demand responsiveness to price changes, our methodology is capable of readily providing the 
net trade-distortion index T as supplement to the traditional NRA/CTE (or PSE/CSE) 
indicators of agricultural policy distortions. Ideally policy analysts would incorporate elasticity 
estimates where available but, where they are not available, these three indicators (R, S and T) 
are nonetheless superior to the existing widely-used agricultural policy measures of trade 
distortions. 
As a special case, if ri = si for all i, that is, if tariff rates are the only distortion, equation 
(3) reduces to a much simpler form: 
            (5)                            
Here ti is the ad valorem tariff rate, which is equal to the rate of distortion of both consumer 
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9 If the aggregate demand and supply curves are linear, this would equate to an assumption that the aggregate 
demand and supply curves have the same slope, so that each side of the market contributes equally to the country-
specific TRI.  11 
 
mean of the tariff rates. This case can be used to obtain an alternative expression for the 
general case. But one must be careful, as this alternative form requires computing an import-
equivalent tariff rate for each tariff item when there is some distortion other than an ad 
valorem tariff. (The Appendix derives the import-equivalent tariff and the alternative 
expression.)  
Now we turn to the measure of the effect of a country’s distortions on its economic 
welfare, the WRI. The derivation follows the same steps as in the derivation of the TRI. This 
leads to a simple comparison of the two indexes. 
The distortions in the market for good i create a welfare loss,  . This loss is given by 
the sum of the change in producer plus consumer surplus net of the tariff revenue. This loss of 





2  {( ) dy /d ( ) dx /d }
P C
i i i ii i i ii p sp p r L =− p      (6)    
where the quantities of good i demanded and supplied,  i x and  i y , are again functions of own 
domestic price alone.   
  Strictly speaking, this result too holds only for small distortions. With non-trivial rates 
of distortion, the welfare losses are defined by the triangular-shaped areas under the demand 
and supply curves for the good. These areas can be obtained by integration. On the assumption 
that the demand and supply functions are linear as in Figure 1, the welfare loss is again given 
by equation (6) with   and   being constant. If the functions are not linear, this 
expression provides an approximation to the loss.   
C
i i dp dx /
P
i i dp dy /
  In the special case where  ri = si = ti, the expression reduces to  
                                                 
10 If the demand and supply curves happened to be linear, this would be the areas of the two triangles jcd and gfe in 




2  () d x / d i ii i i p t L =− p         ( 7 )  
Equation (7) yields the fundamental result that the loss from a tariff is proportional to the 
square of the tariff rate. This holds because the tariff rate determines both the price adjustment 
and the quantity response to this adjustment.
11 If ri ≠ si, as is frequently true in agricultural 
markets, the expression in equation (6) yields the result that the consumer and the producer 
losses are each proportional to the square of the rate of distortion of the consumer or producer 
price, respectively.   
 With  n importable goods subject to different levels of distortions, the aggregate 
welfare loss, in the absence of cross-price effects in all markets, is given by:  
 
P 1 *2 *2
i 2
11
 {( ) d y / d ( ) d x / d }
nn




i p p L
==
=− ∑∑      ( 8 )  
The uniform tariff rate, W, that generates an aggregate deadweight loss identical with that of 
the differentiated set of tariffs is determined by the following equation:  
*2 *2 * 2
11 1
 ( ) dy /d ( ) dx /d ( ) d /d
nn n PC
ii i ii i i i i ii
ii i
p sp r p W pp
== =
−= − ∑∑ ∑ m p
1 / 2
  ( 9 )  
W is thus the uniform tariff which, if applied to all goods in the place of all actual tariffs and 
NTMs and other distortions, would result in the same aggregate loss of welfare as the actual 
distortions. Solving for W, we have:  
                            (10a) 











′= ∑               (10b) 
                                                 
11 This insight is usually attributed to Harberger (1959). In fact, it was discovered by Dupuit (1844), more than 100 
years before Harberger, while analysing the welfare loss resulting from commodity taxation. In his words, “the loss 
of utility increases as the square of the tax” (Dupuit 1844, p. 281). Dupuit’s contribution to consumer surplus and 
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with ui, vi, a and b as defined for equation 3 above. W is the desired Welfare Reduction Index, 
whileR′ and  are the contributions to W from consumer and producer price distortions, 
respectively. They, like their appropriately weighted average W, are means of order two. As 
with the index T, we can deal with, and analyse, the production and consumption sides of the 
sector separately.
S′
12 That is, R′ and S′are attainable with the same information as used to 
estimate the CTE and NRA given the earlier price elasticity assumption – but they provide a 
better indication of the welfare-distorting effect of the traditional consumer or producer price 
measures. 
In equations 3 and 10, the weights in the construction of R′,S′ and W are the same  as 
the weights for R , S  and T except that, in the case of the TRI, arithmetic means of order one are 
constructed whereas in the case of the WRI they are means of order two.
13 This difference is due 
to the fact that the losses of import volume in each market are all proportional to the distortion 
rate whereas the losses of welfare are proportional to the squares of the distortions rates 
(compare equation 1 with equation 6). The tariff rate enters only once in the determination of the 
import loss, as the base of the rectangles in Figure 1, whereas the tariff rate enters twice in the 
                                                 
12 MacLaren and Lloyd (2008) analyse the production side of the Australian agricultural sector with what they call a 
Production Assistance Index. This is the uniform production subsidy that gives the same deadweight production loss 
as the actual differentiated structure of assistance, and so is exactly equal to the production component we derive 
above as . Here we add a similar uniform consumption tax component,  S′ R′ , and seek a WRI that gives the same 
deadweight welfare loss as the sum of those actual welfare losses on the two sides of the market. 
13 Anderson and Neary (2005, p. 21) note that the expressions for their measures of trade restriction and welfare 
reduction use the same weights too. 14 
 
determination of the welfare loss, once in the base and once in the height of the triangles jcd and 
gfe in Figure 1.  
  In the special case where  ri = si = ti for all i, equation 10 reduces to a much simpler 
form: 
         (11) 
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Further, if we assume that the elasticities of import demand for the various products are all 
equal, the weights are the share of imports of each good in total imports. This case can be used 
to obtain an alternative expression of the general case of the WRI. This is done in the 
Appendix.  
 
Adding the exportables sub-sector 
 
The indexes can each be extended to include the exportables sub-sector. An export subsidy in the 
exportable sub-sector reduces welfare in the same way as an import tax in the import-competing 
sub-sector, but it increases trade whereas the import tariff reduces trade. For this reason, it is 
necessary to keep track of import and export price distortions separately, for both producers and 
consumers, for the purpose of estimating the full welfare and trade reduction indexes. In essence, 
this extension is done by extending the commodity set and keeping separate track of the subsets 
of import-competing and exportable goods.  
  The WRI for the whole tradables sector can be written as an expansion of equation 10 
in which goods 1 to n are import-competing products and goods n+1 to z are exportables:  
22 22 {( ) ( ) } MP M XP X MC M XC X WR R a S S b ′′ ′′ =ω + ω + ω + ω
1 / 2                              (12a) 15 
 
where the ω  values are shares of the value of production (consumption) imported or exported 
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It can be seen that when including both import-competing and exportable sub-sectors, we 
continue to first aggregate for producers and consumers separately, where the weights for each 
sub-sector are the share of the sub-sectors’ value of production (consumption) in the total 
value of production (consumption). Producer and consumer distortions are aggregated in the 
last step with the assumption that each of the two sides of the economy contributes equally to 
the overall WRI.  
The resulting measure can be regarded as the import tax/export subsidy which, if 
applied uniformly to all products in the sector, would give the same loss of welfare as the 
combination of measures distorting consumer and producer prices in the import-competing and 
exportable sub-sectors.  
  The TRI can be similarly decomposed as follows:  
b S S a R R T CX X CM M PX X PM M ) ( ) ( ω ω ω ω + + + =                                     (13) 

















The aggregates in equation (14) are the weighted average levels of distortions to consumer and 
producer prices in the exportables sub-sector, respectively, with weights   and   given in 
equation 3b and 3c. Importantly, distortions to the exportables sub-sector enter equation 14 as 
i u i v16 
 
negative values. This is because whilst a lowering of ri (the distortion of the consumer price of 
good i) or si (the distortion of the producer price of good i) in the import-competing sub-sector 
reduces the trade reduction index, a lowering of ri or si in the exportables sub-sector increases it.  
  These extensions of the TRI and the WRI for the exportables sub-sector have precisely 
the same properties as the indexes for the import-competing sector.   
 
World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions database 
 
The database generated by the World Bank’s Agricultural Distortions project (Anderson and 
Valenzuela 2008), using a methodology summarized in Anderson et al. (2008), provides a 
timely opportunity to estimate a time series of national, regional and global welfare and trade 
reduction indexes. The database contains consistent estimates of annual NRAs to the 
agricultural sector and the same number of CTEs for 75 countries over a time period between 
1955 and 2007. The series contains data at the commodity level, for a sub-set of agricultural 
products (called covered products) that account for around 70 percent of total agricultural 
production in the focus countries, which in turn account for 92 percent of global agricultural 
GDP. Aggregate NRAs and CTEs for various sectors and sub-sectors (including import-
competing and exporting sub-sectors) are estimated, using as weights the values of production 
and consumption, respectively, at undistorted prices.
14  
                                                 
14 Estimates of the NRA for total agricultural production in the focus countries are obtained by making 
‘guesstimates’ of the rates of assistance for the remaining 30 percent of agricultural production. Those guesstimates 
are not used in the present study, but their impact can be seen by comparing the third and fourth sets of rows of 
NRAs in Table 1. 17 
 
  The range of measures included in the Agricultural Distortions database NRA estimates 
is wide. By calculating domestic-to-border price ratios the estimates include assistance 
provided by all tariff and non-tariff trade measures, plus any domestic price distoting measures 
(positive or negative), plus an adjustment for the output-price equivalent of direct interventions 
on inputs. Where multiple exchange rates operate, an estimate of the import or export tax 
equivalents of that distortion are included as well. The range of measures included in the CTE 
estimates include both domestic consumer taxes/subsidies plus trade and exchange rate 
policies, all of which drive a wedge between the price that consumers pay for each commodity 
and the international price at the country’s border.  
The most aggregated summaries of NRA and CTE estimates for covered products for 
developing and high-income countries are presented in Tables 1 and 2. These support the 
widely held views that developing country governments had in place agricultural policies that 
effectively taxed their farmers through to the 1980s, and that the extent of those disincentives 
has lessened since then. The extent of taxation was of the order of 15+ percent from the early 
1960s to the mid-1980s. Since then it has not only diminished but, on average, has become 
slightly positive. Table 1 also supports the view that the growth of agricultural protection in 
high-income countries has been going on since the 1950s, and began to reverse only in the 
latter 1980s.
15 It is clear from Table 2 that consumers have experienced changes similar to 
producers in recent years. In developing countries, taxation was negative (i.e. consumer 
subsidization was positive) for most of the last 50 years. This has lessened since the 1990s. In 
                                                 
15 Since the latter 1980s there has been some re-instrumentation towards forms of support — not included here — 
that are somewhat decoupled from production. 18 
 
high-income countries, the implicit taxation of consumers from agricultural support rose until 
the early 1990s but has fallen since then.   
  Tables 1 and 2 also show the trends in NRAs and CTEs, respectively, for four closely 
studied regions: Africa, Asia, Latin America and Europe’s transition economies. On the 
production side, Africa is where there has been least tendency to reduce the taxing of farmers 
and subsidizing of consumers of farm products. Indeed its average NRA has been negative in all 
5-year periods except in the mid-1980s when international prices of farm products reached an 
all-time low in real terms. By contrast, for both Asia and Latin America their average NRAs 
crossed over from negative to positive after the 1980s. And in Europe’s transition economies, the 
nominal assistance to farmers has trended upward following their initial shock in the early 1990s. 
For consumers in all four regions, agricultural policies have almost always involved some 
consumer subsidization. Since the 1980s, however, food consumer subsidization in Asia, Latin 
America and Europe’s transition economies has gradually disappeared and is now replaced by a 
small degree of taxation on average. 
Within the farm sector of all regions, the average NRA for the import-competing sub-
sector is well above that for the export sector, meaning there is an anti-trade bias in the structure 
of distortions. In the case of developing countries where the former NRA is positive and the 
latter negative, the two tend to offset each other such that the overall sectoral NRA is close to 
zero. Such a sectoral average can thus be misleading as an indication of the extent of distortion 
within the sector. It can also be misleading when compared across countries that have varying 
degrees of dispersion in their NRAs for different farm industries.  
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Table 3 reports the TRIs for agricultural import-competing products, exportables, and all 
covered tradable farm products from 1960 to 2007 for the five main studied regions and for the 
world as a whole.
16 For developing countries as a group, the trade restrictiveness of 
agricultural policy was roughly constant or slightly rising until the early 1990s and thereafter it 
declined, for all regions — Africa, Asia and Latin America. For high-income countries the TRI 
time path was similar. The aggregate results for developing countries are driven by the 
exportables sub-sector which is being taxed and the import-competing sub-sector which is 
being protected (albeit by less than in high-income countries – see Tables 1 and 3). For high-
income countries, policies support both exporting and import-competing agricultural products 
and, even though they favour the latter much more heavily, the assistance to exporters offsets 
somewhat the anti-trade bias from the protection of import-competing producers in terms of 
their impacts on those countries’ aggregate volume of trade in farm products. This is reflected 
in much smaller TRIs for high-income countries in the third as compared with the first row for 
high-income countries in Table 3.  
  The TRI correctly aggregates the restrictiveness of sub-sector policies that are masked 
in aggregate NRA and CTE measures, because they offset one another. Using the example of 
Africa in 1985-89 when the NRA was closest to zero, the TRI peaks at this time in a way that 
correctly identifies the trade-reducing effect of positive protection to the import-competing 
sub-sector and disprotection to the exportables sub-sector. 
                                                 
16 National TRIs and WRIs are aggregated across countries using an average of the value of consumption and 
production at undistorted prices. National and regional indexes for the 5-year periods are unweighted averages of the 
annual indexes. 20 
 
  Table 4 reports the WRIs, again for agricultural import-competing products, 
exportables, and all covered tradable farm products from 1960 to 2007 for the five main 
studied regions and for the world as a whole. The WRI results for covered products show a 
similar pattern over the five regions: there is a constant or increasing tendency for policies to 
reduce welfare from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, but thereafter the opposite occurs in almost 
all regions. This pattern is generated by different policy regimes in different regions. In high-
income countries, agriculture was assisted throughout the period, although it peaked in the 
1980s (at around 60 percent) and thereafter fell. By contrast, in developing countries, 
agriculture was disprotected until the mid-1980s, and only thereafter did taxation of 
developing country farmers decline to the point that they received positive assistance by the 
turn of the century. The first point to note about the WRI, then, is that it has the desirable 
property of correctly identifying the welfare consequences that result from both positive and 
negative assistance regimes for the sector.  
  A second point to note is that the WRI provides a better indicator of the welfare cost of 
distortions than the average level of assistance or taxation in the Agricultural Distortions 
database (NRA and CTE in Tables 1 and 2). Although the latter are a significant contribution 
in their own right, they can be misleading as a pair of indicators of the extent of the welfare 
costs of assistance or taxation. This is due to the inclusion in the WRI of the ‘power of two’. 
That is, a weighted arithmetic mean NRA and CTE does not fully reflect the welfare effects of 
agricultural distortions because the dispersion of that support or taxation across products has 
been ignored. By contrast, the WRI captures the higher welfare costs of high and peak levels of 
assistance or taxation. A good example of this is the WRI for high-income countries: the NRA 
series for high-income countries is everywhere positive, but the WRI series lies above the 
NRA series owing to its capturing of the dispersion of the NRA. That is, the WRI captures the 21 
 
so-called ‘disparity’ issue discussed in Lloyd (1974): the larger the variance in assistance 
levels within a sector, the greater the potential for resources to be used in activities which do 
not maximize economic welfare.  
  A third point to note is that the WRI and its two components — unlike the arithmetic 
mean measures of assistance/taxation (the NRA and CTE) — reflect the true welfare cost of 
agricultural policies when they have offsetting components. This can be seen most clearly for 
the case of Africa where, in the latter half of 1980s, it was still taxing exportables but had 
moved (temporarily) from low to very high positive levels of protection for import-competing 
farm products (Table 1). In 1985-89 the weighted average NRA for African import-competing 
and exporting farmers was close to zero, yet the WRI for Africa peaks in that time period. That 
is, while at the aggregate level African farmers received almost no government assistance then, 
the welfare cost of the mixture of agricultural programs as a whole was at its highest. 
  The TRI generally shows greater variance than the WRI series. This is because the TRI 
measure is sensitive to switches from negative to positive rates of assistance. For example, a 
move from -30 to +30 percent rates of assistance would have little or no effect on the welfare 
consequences of the policy, but it could have a significant effect on trade restrictiveness: net 
imports of farm products would be greater when the NRA is negative than when it is positive, 
ceteris paribus.  
  What can be said about agricultural distortions in the world as a whole? The fact that 
NRAs for high-income and developing countries diverged (in opposite ways) away from zero 
in the first half of the period under study, and then converged toward zero in the most recent 
quarter-century, meant that their weighted average NRA traced out a fairly flat trend for the 
world, with a dip in the early 1980s. By contrast, Figure 2 shows the WRI and TRI for the 
world as a whole tracing out a hill-shaped path and thus providing less misleading indicators of 22 
 
the evolving disarray in world agricultural markets. Figure 2 suggests that the global welfare 
cost of distortions has been much higher than implied by the NRA, but more so in earlier 
decades than in the current one. Both the WRI and TRI for the world suggest that the disarray 
in world agricultural markets was slightly less by the early 2000s than it was in the early 
1960s. 
  Which countries or commodities contributed most to the decline in the WRI since the 
latter 1980s? Overall, the global WRI fell by nearly half from 1985–89 to 2000–04 (46 percent, 
whether measured in percentage terms or constant US dollars).
17 Table 5 reports the 
decomposition of this fall by region, country and agricultural commodity. At a regional level, the 
fall was due mostly to decreases in the welfare restrictiveness of policies in high-income 
countries and Asia. High-income countries contributed over half of the change in the WRI, and 
Asia more than one-third (last column of Table 5). The higher agricultural output value of high-
income countries meant that even though the change in the WRI for Asia was greater at 58 
percent, as compared to 42 percent for high-income countries, the latter still contributed the most 
to the global WRI reduction. In high-income countries, the period under analysis was a time of 
moving some product-specific assistance to decoupled assistance. This potentially explains some 
of the fall in covered product assistance over the time period. As noted below, one area for 
further research would be to decompose the WRI by policy instrument, which would shed light 
                                                 
17 To measure the global WRI in constant US dollars, we sum the national WRIs in constant dollars of all countries 
(obtained by multiplying the country WRIs in percentage terms by the average of the national value of production 
and consumption in constant 2000 $US, measured at undistorted prices). The fall in the WRI in constant dollar terms 
could be greater than the fall in the WRI in percentage terms if there was a real increase in the value of global 
agricultural production over time. Both our percentage and constant dollar falls in the WRI are 46 percent, indicating 
that the real value of global agriculture was stable in aggregate over the period analysed.  23 
 
on this aspect of the results. Among the Asian developing countries, China (and to a much lesser 
extent India) contributed most significantly to the reduction in the global WRI, in line with the 
pursuit of other economic reforms. Some countries contributed to an increase in the global WRI, 
such as Korea, but their contributions are lot listed in Table 5 if they were less than 2 percent of 
the overall global change. The bottom part of Table 5 shows that milk, rice and the horticultural 
sub-sector were the most significant contributors by product to the decline in the WRI globally 
over the time period shown, accounting for around 70 percent of the total reduction, with meat 





This paper contributes to the theoretical and empirical literature on trade and welfare reduction 
indexes. On the theory side, it develops a method of calculating the TRI and WRI directly 
from estimates of the rates of distortion of producer and consumer prices. The Appendix shows 
that these calculations of the TRI and the WRI are equivalent to an alternative method using, 
for each good, a calculation of the trade-equivalent and the welfare-equivalent rates of trade 
taxation. The main contribution of the theoretical component of the paper is to demonstrate 
that policy analysts can estimate national, regional and global measures of distortions to 
agricultural markets that are superior to and yet use the same data as existing indicators, 
provided one is willing to make some simplifying assumptions about price elasticities. 
                                                 
18 To compute the commodity contributions, we first work at the national level to obtain the constant dollar 
contribution of each commodity to the respective national WRIs. We then sum these contributions in constant dollar 
terms across all countries for each commodity.  24 
 
Furthermore, changes over time in the global indexes can be decomposed to reveal underlying 
contributions by country and commodity. 
Empirically, the paper’s contribution is to apply the methodology to generate time 
series of indexes for agricultural goods that are well-grounded in trade theory, account for 
different forms of price distortions, and can be decomposed into their component producer 
assistance and consumer tax measures. These indexes – full details of which have been made 
freely available by Anderson and Croser (2009) for all 75 developing and developed countries 
over the past half-century – are useful supplements to aggregate NRAs and CTEs (and the 
PSEs and CSEs generated by the OECD) for monitoring national policy developments and 
making cross-country comparisons. They also provide better global indicators of the trade and 
welfare effects of food and agricultural price and trade policies, given that developing and 
high-income countries’ NRAs or CTEs have tended in the past to offset each other. Current 
TRIs could be also useful for trade negotiators seeking trading partner ‘concessions’ that are 
equal in terms of trade expansion.  
Both the WRI and TRI for the world as a whole trace out a hill-shaped path between 
1960 and 2004, suggesting that the disarray in world agricultural markets worsened in the first 
half of that period but has improved considerably since then such that there are slightly less 
distortions now than in the early 1960s. Our decomposition underscores the importance of 
China in reducing global welfare distortions from agricultural policies since the 1980s, but the 
European Union and Japan have also contributed non-trivially to a fall in the global WRI over 
the past quarter-century.  
Methodologically it would not be difficult to re-calculate the WRIs and TRIs that 
include actual own-price elasticity of supply and demand estimates once reliable commodity-25 
 
specific estimates for each country become available.
19 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) 
provide a methodology for estimating trade elasticities, so that may be able to be adapted to the 
agricultural distortions case. Further complexity could be added by including cross-price 
elasticities, although for agriculture the available estimates suggest that, apart from a few 
obvious exceptions, these are very low (see, e.g., Tyers and Anderson 1992, Appendix Tables 
A2 to A4).  
In the meantime, we believe the transparency of the method in this paper, 
notwithstanding its simplifying elasticity assumption, has the potential to add significant value 
to many policy analyses. In developing countries especially, where input-output tables and 
associated CGE models are scarce or inaccurate and yet time series indicators of welfare and 
trade reducing effects of policies are desired for monitoring purposes, our approach could 
prove to be a very useful and low-cost substitute for such modeling.  
An extension to this work could involve using the same methodology to construct 
index numbers of distortions not from the perspective of a single country but rather from a 
global view of individual commodity markets. A related extension could be to drill down to 
                                                 
19 It is not clear, a priori, what the effect is of this simplifying assumption, because the effects across markets and on 
the consumption and production sides of the economy could offset each other. However, relaxing the assumption 
would entail a move to ‘marginal welfare weights’, instead of production or consumption share weights when 
estimating the producer or consumer components of the indexes, respectively. The additional assumption that a 
country’s sectoral aggregate elasticities of supply and demand are equal (i.e. a=b=0.5) turns out empirically to 
matter very little because our data are such that estimates of the production and consumption distortion indexes are 
similar in magnitude (reflecting the fact that the vast majority of distortions come from border measures). Sensitivity 
analysis undertaken to test the importance of the assumption that a equals b confirmed that expectation: by assuming 
instead that a is half or twice as large as b, the estimated regional TRIs and WRIs were altered by less than one-
twentieth. 26 
 
further understand the trends in the WRI and TRI presented above. We have decomposed the 
results to a regional, country and commodity level, but the NRA and CTE measures underlying 
the WRI and TRI are themselves derived from prices and different policy instruments. The 
relative contribution of international price movements, and of different instruments, could 
improve our understanding of the history of food and agriculture policies and provide more 
insights for on-going national policy dialogues and future rounds of agricultural trade 
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Appendix: Alternative expressions for the TRI and the WRI using import-
equivalent and welfare-equivalent tariff rates 
 
This Appendix derives alternative expressions for the TRI and the WRI which are simpler and 
can be related to other measures in the existing literature. First, we require the concepts of the 
import-equivalent tariff rate and the welfare-equivalent tariff rate.  
When the market is distorted by a measure or measures other than a tariff, the usual 
practice is to take the producer price distortion as the equivalent rate (for example, Kee, Nicita 
and Olarreaga 2008, 2009). We can call this rate the producer-price equivalent rate. But this 
procedure is not, in general, correct because this producer-price equivalent rate does not 
replicate the effect on trade or welfare of the measure(s). The computation of the equivalent 
rates requires the rates of both the producer price and the consumer price distortions.
20  
  
Import-equivalent tariff rates 
 
The import-equivalent tariff rate is the tariff rate that results in the same restriction of imports as 
the combination of measures applied to good i.  
                                                 
20 One must be careful in calculating these rates. In some cases, the effects of two (or more) measures on the 
distortions of producer and consumer prices are not additive. For example, suppose that the producers are assisted by 
a 10 per cent tariff and a quota that, if applied alone, would raise producer and consumer prices by 20 per cent. The 
combined effect of these two measures on producer and consumer prices is only 20 per cent. In other cases, one or a 
combination of measures may prohibit trade. In such a case, the relevant rate is the prohibitive tariff rate. 30 
 
When the market is distorted by a combination of measures that distort the consumer and 
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Welfare-equivalent tariff rates 
 
The welfare-equivalent tariff rate,  , is the tariff rate that results in the same loss of welfare 
as the combination of measures applied to a good. As in the case of tariffs, we take the welfare 
triangles as the measure of welfare loss.   
W
i t
When the market for a good is distorted by a combination of measures that distort the 
consumer and a producer prices differentially, the welfare loss (from equation 7 above) is:  
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This is the sum of two triangles. The two effects of the changes in consumer and producer prices 
capture all of the welfare effects when markets are competitive. The welfare-equivalent tariff is 
defined by the following equality: 
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  where ai and bi are as defined in equation A.2.   
The welfare-equivalent tariff rate is also a weighted average of the rates of distortion of 
consumer and producer prices, the weights again being their share of the import response to 
the change in price. However, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate is the mean of order 2, not the 
arithmetic mean (which is the mean of order 1). If   and   then  .  0 i r > 0 i s > 0
W
i t >
  Because both the import-equivalent and the welfare-equivalent tariff rates are means of 
the rates of producer and consumer distortions, they lie between these two rates, provided the 
weights are positive. For the same reason, both rates are different than the producer-price 
equivalent rate. They are greater or less than this rate depending on whether the producer price 
distortion rate is less than or greater than the consumer price distortion rate.  
Importantly, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate is not equal to the import-equivalent 
tariff rate when the rate of distortion of the producer price is not equal to the rate of distortion 
of the consumer price. In fact, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate must be greater than the 
import-equivalent rate.
21 The difference between these two equivalent rates increases with the 
difference between the producer and the consumer distortion rate.  
 
21 From the Theorem of the Mean, the mean of order 2 is strictly greater than the mean of order 1 if ri≠ si. 32 
 
  With some non-tariff measures, the rates of distortion of the producer price and the 
consumer price are equal. In these cases, the import-equivalent and the welfare-equivalent 
tariff rate are equal, and both are equal to the producer-price equivalent. This holds for variable 
levies. Quotas also fall into this category if the conditions required for equivalence are satisfied 
and if the quota is auctioned or one treats the quota rents accruing to private quota-holders in 
the same way as revenues accruing to the government under a regime of tariffs only. 
As one example, consider an industry that is assisted by an output-based subsidy alone. 
For the sake of illustration, we make the assumption that the slopes of the demand and supply 
functions are equal (ignoring signs). Then  
( /) (/ ) (/ )2 (/
CP
ii i i i ii dm dp dx d dy d dy d )
P
i p p =−= − p
i i
   and   ti
I = ½si.   
Hence, as required, the import-equivalent tariff rate is not equal to the producer-price 
equivalent tariff rate ( ). In fact, it is exactly one half of this rate, because the import tariff 
affects both the domestic demand and the domestic supply whereas the subsidy affects on the 
supply side of the market. On the other hand, the welfare-equivalent tariff rate is 0.71  
(={0.5( )
2}
1/2). This rate too is less than the producer-price equivalent tariff rate, and it is 




As a second example, suppose a good is assisted by a combination of a 20 per cent 
tariff and a subsidy of 20 per cent in ad valorem terms. The consumer price increases by 20 per 
cent and the producer price by 40 per cent. If, again, the domestic demand and supply curves 
have the same slope, the import-equivalent rate is 30 (= per cent. The 
welfare-equivalent tariff rate for this combination is 31.2 (={0.5(0.2)
2+0.5(0.4)
2}
1/2) per cent. 
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and where εi (< 0) are the elasticities of the import demand function in the free-trade situation 
and 
** ( ii p m  are the values of imports in the free-trade situation. If the definitions of  in 
equation A.2 are inserted into equation A.5, it is easily seen that the form in equation A.5 is 
identical that in equation 4.  
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  Similarly, define the WRI as:  










 where       (A.6)             
If the definitions of  in equation A.4 are inserted into equation A.6, it is easily seen that the 
form in equation A.6 is identical that in equation 12. 
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In effect, the indexes in equations A.5 and A.6 are calculated in two stages.
22 First, we 
calculate the import-equivalent (welfare- equivalent) tariff rate of distortions to both producer 
and consumer prices in each market and then we average these tariff rates across all goods. 
These forms of the indexes are particularly useful if we are interested in the contributions 
which the distortions in the market for each good make to the aggregate loss of trade or 
welfare for the country. 
 
 
22 Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga (2009) use the expression in equation A.6 but again they wrongly use the producer 
price distortion in place of the welfare-equivalent tariff rate. Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance,
a Africa, Asia, Latin America, European transition economies and high-income country regions, 
all farm products, 1960 to 2007       (percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69  1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04  2005-07 
Covered import-competing products            
Africa  12 4  -7 8 8  65 2 7 3  na 
Asia
  4 34  26 31 21 45 28 28 35 na 
Latin  America  20 3  -4 2  10 4  17 9  19  na 
All  developing  countries  11 26  17 23 17 39 22 22 28 na 
Europe’s transition economies
b  na na  na na na na 31 34 34 30 
High-income  countries  54 59  42 56 70 84 73 64 60 31 
World  48 50  37 46 46 66 51 43 44 na 
Covered exportables             
Africa  -31 -39  -44 -45 -36 -36 -39 -26 -28  na 
Asia
  -13 -26  -20 -25 -44 -39 -19  -4  0  na 
Latin  America  -23 -17  -30 -26 -27 -24  -9  -3  -4  na 
All  developing  countries  -25 -29  -29 -30 -40 -37 -19  -5  -3  na 
Europe’s transition economies
b  na na  na na na na -4 -1  0 15 
High-income  countries  4  10  8 7 8  17  13 6 5 3 
World  -2  -4  -7 -11 -24 -21  -8  -1  0  na 
All covered farm products (incl.  nontradables)          
Africa  -13 -18  -22 -20 -12  1 -12  -7  -9  na 
Asia
  -3  3  0  0 -21 -15  -5  6  10  na 
Latin  America  -13 -13  -25 -20 -15 -14  1  1  3  na 
All developing countries  -9  -5  -9  -8  -20  -13  -5  4  7  na 
Europe’s transition economies
b  na na  na na na na  7 15 15 21 
High-income  countries  32 39  29 36 43 58 49 36 32 16 
World  24 24  15 18  6 16 18 16 16 na 
All agriculture (incl.  non-covered  products)            
Africa  -8  -11  -15  -13 -8 -1 -9 -6 -7 na 
Asia  -27 -25  -25 -24 -21  -9  -2  8  12  na 
Latin  America  -8  -7  -21 -18 -13 -11  4  5  5  na 
All developing countries
  -23 -22  -24 -22 -18  -8  -2  6  9  na 
Europe’s transition economies
b  na na  na na na na 10 18 18 25 
High-income  countries  29 35  25 32 41 53 46 35 32 17 
World  22 21  13 15  8 17 18 17 18 na 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
a Weighted using the value of production at undistorted prices.  
b For Europe’s transition economies, estimates start only in 1992.              2
Table 2: Consumer tax equivalents
a, Africa, Asia, Latin America, European transition economies and high-income regions, all covered 
farm products, 1960 to 2007         
(percent) 
    1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products              
Africa  7 0  -8 7 3  76 5 9  5  na 
Asia
  1 14  8 24 24 44 32 27  35  na 
Latin  America  23  11 0 8 4 1  28  11  18  na 
All  developing  countries  6 11  4 18 17 39 29 22  27  na 
Europe’s transition economies
c  na na na na na na 12 21  31  30 
High-income  countries  53 56 41 54 65 66 57 55  50  30 
World  46 44 32 43 43 55 41 38  39  na 
Exportable products             
Africa  -29 -36 -42 -34 -28 -31 -38 -20  -24 na 
Asia
  -3 -38 -29 -32 -42 -40 -20  -5 0 na 
Latin  America  -25 -14 -25 -24 -27 -21 -12  1 0 na 
All  developing  countries  -23 -36 -33 -30 -38 -37 -20  -5  -1 na 
Europe’s transition economies
c  na na na na na na -6 -4  2  -1 
High-income  countries  4  11 9 9 6  11 8  -2  -3  0 
World  0  -8  -9 -11 -24 -24 -11  -4  -2 na 
All covered farm products
b             
Africa  -8  -12  -16 -9 -6 16 -8  0  -3  na 
Asia
  0 -12 -15  -2 -15 -14  -3  5  10 na 
Latin  America  -7  -7 -18 -13 -12 -10  13  6 8 na 
All developing countries  -5  -12  -16  -5  -14  -10  0  5  8  na 
Europe’s transition economies
c  na na na na na na -2  9  17  11 
High-income  countries  35 42 30 40 45 49 41 32  27  16 
World  28 23 14 21 10 15 16 15  16  na 
Source: Anderson and Valenzuela (2008) 
a Weighted using the value of consumption at undistorted prices.  
b Includes nontradables.  
c For Europe’s transition economies, estimates start only in 1992.              3
Table 3: Trade Reduction Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all 
covered tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007 
(percent) 
  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products              
Africa  9 2  -7 7 5  71 4 8  4  — 
Asia
  3 24 17 27 22 45 31 28  36  — 
Latin  America  22 8  -2 5 7 2  23  10  19  — 
All  developing  countries  8 19 11 21 17 39 26 22  28  — 
Europe’s transition economies
b  — — — — — — 22 28  33  30 
High-income  countries  51 56 40 54 68 75 66 60  56  31 
World  45 46 33 44 45 61 46 41  42  — 
Exportable products               
Africa  30 38 43 39 32 33 38 23  26  — 
Asia
  9 32 24 28 42 40 20  4  0  — 
Latin  America  24 15 28 24 26 22 10  1  2  — 
All  developing  countries  23 31 30 29 39 37 20  5  2  — 
Europe’s transition economies
b  — — — — — —  5  2  -2  -9 
High-income  countries  -3  -10 -8 -7 -7  -14  -11 -2  -1  -2 
World  2  6  8 11 24 22 10  3  1  — 
All covered farm tradables               
Africa  21 22 21 26 18 50 18 14  14  — 
Asia
  7 29 27 28 35 41 23 12  11  — 
Latin  America  24 14 21 18 19 14 17  5  8  — 
All  developing  countries  17 26 24 26 31 38 22 11  11  — 
Europe’s transition economies
b  — — — — — —  8 14  14 6 
High-income  countries  30 33 23 32 40 45 39 33  29  15 
World  27 30 23 30 34 41 28 20  18  — 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices.               
b For Europe’s transition economies, estimates start only in 1992.              4
Table 4: Welfare Reduction Indexes, Asian, African, Latin American, Europe’s transition economies and high-income regions
a, all 
covered tradable farm products, 1960 to 2007         
(percent) 
  1960-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99  2000-04  2005-07 
Import-competing products              
Africa  59 52 53 47 51 98 43 32  30  — 
Asia  36 45 46 50 48 62 48 44  48  — 
Latin  America  54 34 27 37 47 40 46 26  32  — 
All  developing  countries  47 45 45 47 48 62 48 40  43  — 
Europe’s transition economies
b  — — — — — — 60 44  45  43 
High-income  countries  77  85  69  99 106 123 102  91 87 50 
World  72 75 64 84 81  100 78 65  65  — 
Exportable products               
Africa  37 44 48 49 48 55 58 41  40  — 
Asia  24 43 34 34 48 45 24 10 7  — 
Latin  America  28 22 36 32 36 33 29 12  15  — 
All  developing  countries  31 39 38 36 46 44 27 11  10  — 
Europe’s transition economies
b  — — — — — — 37 33  31  42 
High-income  countries  11 19 15 12 11 25 22 11  11  10 
World  15 26 25 24 34 39 26 13  12  — 
All covered farm tradables
               
Africa  51 51 52 49 50 80 52 37  36  — 
Asia  32 45 44 45 50 51 33 23  21  — 
Latin  America  37 26 36 35 42 37 39 18  22  — 
All  developing  countries  41 43 44 43 48 51 36 23  22  — 
Europe’s transition economies
b  — — — — — — 47 40  40  44 
High-income  countries  55 66 54 73 77 95 77 60  58  33 
World  53 59 51 62 61 70 54 39  38  — 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). 
a Regional aggregates are weighted using the average of the value of production and the value of consumption at undistorted prices. 
b For Europe’s transition economies, estimates start only in 1992.            
  Table 5: Decomposition of the global reduction in the Welfare Reduction Index, by 
region/country and by commodity,








% change in WRI 
(measured in constant 
dollars), 1985-89 to 
2000-04  
% contribution to 
change in global WRI 
(measured in constant  
dollars), 1985-89 to 
2000-04 
        
 All countries/regions
a 
70.2 37.7 -45.9 100.0
High-income countries  95.3  57.5  -41.6  55.0 
Asia (excl. Japan)  50.7  21.2  -58.0  38.9 
Latin America  36.6  21.6  -34.2  3.3 
Africa 79.8  35.9  -52.0  5.6 
Specific countries:
b        
China   47.9  8.0  -84.5  36.0 
EU-15 110.8  50.5  -51.4  29.0 
Japan   247.5  213.2  -22.0  9.2 
US 34.9  24.9  -30.5  5.4 
India 86.7  26.7  -44.9  4.3 
Egypt 133.4  21.6  -84.6  3.9 
Brazil 39.5  6.7  -83.8  3.8 
Canada 89.8  42.0  -55.0  2.9 
Specific products globally:
b        
Milk   -66.7  37.4 
Fruits and vegetables  -80.0  21.7 
Rice -25.4  12.2 
Pigmeat -74.3  8.6 
Wheat -47.7  4.8 
Beef -28.8  4.7 
Barley -83.1  3.3 
Sheepmeat -87.1  3.0 
Sugar -21.1  2.5 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008)  
a European transition economies are not included as their data are unreliable prior to 1992. 
b Countries/commodities with a contribution to the decline in the global WRI in the range +2 to -
2 percent are not shown. Some countries and commodities make a negative contribution (though 
none more than 2 percent) if their WRI (or share of the global WRI) increases over time, instead 
of decreasing in line with the overall global reduction. Since we sum across products at the 
country level to generate the TRI and WRI indexes, there are no estimates to insert in columns 1 
and 2.   2
Figure 1: Trade and welfare losses for an import-competing product subjected to differing 






Source: Authors’ depiction. 
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Figure 2: Nominal Rate of Assistance and Trade and Welfare Reduction Indexes for covered 
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on product NRAs and CTEs in Anderson and Valenzuela 
(2008). 
 